<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML xmlns:o = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w =
"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word"><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<META content="MSHTML 6.00.2900.2769" name=GENERATOR>
<STYLE>@page Section1 {size: 595.3pt 841.9pt; margin: 70.85pt 3.0cm 70.85pt 3.0cm; }
P.MsoNormal {
FONT-SIZE: 12pt; MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: "Times New Roman"
}
LI.MsoNormal {
FONT-SIZE: 12pt; MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: "Times New Roman"
}
DIV.MsoNormal {
FONT-SIZE: 12pt; MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt; FONT-FAMILY: "Times New Roman"
}
A:link {
COLOR: blue; TEXT-DECORATION: underline
}
SPAN.MsoHyperlink {
COLOR: blue; TEXT-DECORATION: underline
}
A:visited {
COLOR: purple; TEXT-DECORATION: underline
}
SPAN.MsoHyperlinkFollowed {
COLOR: purple; TEXT-DECORATION: underline
}
SPAN.EstiloCorreioElectrnico17 {
COLOR: navy; FONT-FAMILY: Arial; mso-style-type: personal-reply
}
DIV.Section1 {
page: Section1
}
</STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY lang=PT vLink=purple link=blue bgColor=#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><FONT
face=Arial size=2></FONT><BR><?/smaller><?/fontfamily><?fontfamily><?param Times New Roman>Integrado
no CICLO DE CONFERÊNCIAS SOBRE DECISÃO, organizado pelo Instituto de
Investigação Interdisciplinar da Universidade de Coimbra em associação com o
INESC Coimbra e a Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra vai
realizar-se a seguinte conferência:<BR> <BR>Sexta-feira, <STRONG>11
de Novembro de 2005, às 14h30</STRONG><BR>Prof. John Broome (University of
Oxford, UK) <BR>Título:<?/fontfamily><?fontfamily><?param Arial> <?/fontfamily><?fontfamily><?param Times New Roman>Deciding by practical
reasoning<BR>Comentador: Prof. Joaquim Feio (FEUC)<BR>Local: Sala Keynes
(Entrada livre)<BR><?bigger><?x-tad-bigger> <BR>O Prof. John Broome é
“White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy” no Fellow of Corpus Christi College da
Universidade de Oxford. Licenciou-se em Matemática e Economia pela Universidade
de Cambridge e doutorou-se em Economia nos EUA pelo MIT. Possui ainda um
Mestrado em Filosofia pela Universidade de Londres. Antes de se mudar para
Oxford, leccionou nas universidades de Londres, Bristol e St. Andrews, entre
outras actividades como professor visitante em variados países. Além da sua
formação, a lista dos livros que publicou espelha bem o seu ecletismo: “The
Microeconomics of Capitalism” (Academic Press), “Weighing Goods: Equality,
Uncertainty and Time” (Blackwell), “Counting the Cost of Global Warming” (White
Horse Press), “Ethics Out of Economics” (Cambridge University Press) e “Weighing
Lives” (Oxford University Press).<BR> <BR><STRONG>Nesta conferência, John
Broome falará os processos de raciocínio associados à tomada de
decisão.</STRONG> O resumo enviado pelo autor é o
seguinte:<BR> <BR><<We acquire our intentions in various ways, and
one of them is by making a decision. To decide is to form an intention
deliberately – that is by a process of deliberation or, in other words, by
reasoning. This talk will investigate processes of reasoning that conclude in an
intention. This sort of reasoning is traditionally identified as practical
reasoning, to distinguish it from theoretical reasoning, which is reasoning that
concludes in a belief. Practical reasoning was studied by Aristotle, but David
Hume denied it even exists; Hume thought all reasoning is theoretical. His
scepticism about practical reasoning persists today. Many philosophers today
think the nearest thing there is to practical reasoning is reasoning about what
we ought to do. This sort of reasoning concludes in a belief about what we ought
to do, not in an intention. So it is theoretical reasoning about normative
matters, rather than genuinely practical reasoning. According to these
philosophers, if we make decisions at all, we do not make them by
reasoning.<BR>One purpose of this talk will be to respond to Hume’s scepticism.
Ishall develop an account of reasoning in general that includes practical
reasoning as one species. On my account, reasoning is an activity by means of
which we can bring ourselves to satisfy some of the requirements of rationality.
I shall explain how reasoning is a real activity – something we do rather than
something that happens to us. So when we make a decision it is really we who
decide. I shall also give an general account of the nature of requirements of
<BR>rationality, and formulate some specific requirements. Some are theoretical
requirements on the structure of our beliefs. For example, rationality requires
us not to have beliefs that contradict each other. Others requirements are
practical, by which I mean that they are requirements on our intentions. Among
the practical requirements are requirements of instrumental rationality. One is
the requirement that we intend whatever we believe to be a necessary means to an
end that we intend. I shall explain how an activity of reasoning can bring us to
satisfy this and other instrumental requirements. I shall also examine a
non-instrumental requirement of rationality: that we intend to do whatever we
believe we ought to do. This is the crucial link between theoretical rationality
and practical rationality; it is through this requirement that theoretical
reasoning about normative matters can become truly practical. I shall explain
how reasoning can bring us to satisfy this practical requirement
too.>><BR><BR><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></DIV><?/x-tad-bigger><?/bigger><?/fontfamily></BODY></HTML>