[Divulgacao] Conferência de Alexis Tsoukias; Conferência de Paul Slovic

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----- Original Message ----- 
From: Instituto Investigação Interdisciplinar 
To: 'GREXTE - FCTUC (GREXTE - FCTUC)' 
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2005 10:30 AM
Subject: FW: Conferência de Alexis Tsoukias


 


    Subject: Conferência de Alexis Tsoukias

    Integrado no CICLO DE CONFERÊNCIAS SOBRE DECISÃO, organizado pelo
    Instituto de Investigação Interdisciplinar da Universidade de Coimbra em
    associação com o INESC Coimbra e a Faculdade de Economia da Universidade
    de Coimbra vai realizar-se a seguinte conferência:

    Sexta-feira, 14 de Outubro de 2005, às 14h30
    Prof. Alexis Tsoukiàs (University of Paris IX, France)
    Título: From decision theory to decision aiding methodology
    Comentador: Prof. Manuel Matos (FEUP)
    Local: Sala Keynes da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra
    (Entrada livre)


    Nascido na Grécia, o Prof. Alexis Tsoukiàs doutorou-se no Politecnico di
    Torino. Exerceu funções docentes e de investigação nessa escola,
    posteriormente na Université Libre de Bruxelles, e finalmente na
    Université Paris-Dauphine. Actualmente é investigador do prestigiado CNRS,
    dirigindo a unidade de Apoio à Decisão do Laboratoire d'Analyse et
    Modélisation de Systèmes pour l'Aide à la Décision da Université
    Paris-Dauphine. É ainda actualmente presidente da Associação Europeia de
    Sociedades de Investigação Operacional.

    Nesta conferência, Alexis Tsoukiàs apresentará a sua perspectiva acerca da
    teoria da decisão e da metodologia do apoio à decisão, focando-se nesta
    última para discutir o papel do consultor, confrontando-o por exemplo com
    o papel de um advogado com o papel de um médico. O resumo enviado pelo
    autor é o seguinte:

    <<The aim of this presentation is to reflect about the contents of the
    ``decision aiding'' profession and the methodology and theories to that
    associated. I first introduce a brief (and personal) reconstruction of the
    history of Operational Research and Decision Theory. In such a
    reconstruction I try to focus on the ``extensions'' of this theory during
    the last 60 years and to justify my claim that there have been several
    ``decision theories'' developed, all of them with a different
    legitimization background.
    I then try to identify what ultimately characterises the profession of a
    ``decision analyst'' or of an ``operational researcher'' compared with
    other professions where decision aiding is also practiced such as lawyers
    and psychotherapists. Two main features are thus identified:
    - the abstract and formal language used in conducting the decision aiding;
    - the use of a model of rationality at least as legitimisation for action.
    Bearing in mind these characteristics we can try to analyse the activities
    undertaken by an ``analyst'' when a client contacts him/her for receiving
    decision support. In order to introduce a formal frame to such activities
    I introduce the concept of ``decision aiding process'', a particular type
    of decision process.
    The introduction of these concepts allows on the hand to change the
    perspective as far as the different decision theories are concerned and
    the other hand to focus our attention on the type of outcomes this process
    generates. I therefore use this frame for both analyzing the different
    decision aiding approaches discussed in the literature and for
    characterizing the type of activities used in order to provide decision
    support. This last analysis allows to get also several operational
    recommendations which can be sent in order to train young professionals in
    decision aiding.>>



    Subject: Conferência de Paul Slovic

    Integrado no CICLO DE CONFERÊNCIAS SOBRE DECISÃO, organizado pelo
    Instituto de Investigação Interdisciplinar da Universidade de Coimbra em
    associação com o INESC Coimbra e a Faculdade de Economia da Universidade
    de Coimbra vai realizar-se a seguinte conferência:

    Sexta-feira, 14 de Outubro de 2005, às 10h30
    Prof. Paul Slovic (University of Oregon , USA)
    Título: The Affect Heuristic: Exploring the Psychological Foundations of
    Judgment and Decision Making
    Comentador: Prof. Armando Mónica de Oliveira (FPCE, UC)
    Local: Sala Keynes da Feculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra
    (Entrada livre)

    O Prof. Paul Slovic é o fundador e presidente do centro de investigação
    "Decision Research", dedicando-se ao estudo do julgamento humano, da
    tomada de decisão e da análise de risco. Tem-de dedicado a assuntos que
    vão desde as decisões pessoais (motivações para usar cintos de segurança,
    ou para deixar de fumar) às decisões sociais (risco de terrorismo, riscos
    associados a novas tecnologias, preservação do meio ambiente). É ao mesmo
    tempo um bem sucedido consultor de organizações empresariais e
    governamentais e um eminente académico (destacando-se entre inúmeras
    publicações o livro "Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases" em
    co-autoria com Amos Tversky e o recente Nobel da Economia Daniel
    Kahneman). Recebeu em 1991 o "Distinguished Contribution Award" da Society
    for Risk Analysis, de que foi presidente, e recebeu em 1993 o
    "Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award" da American Psychological
    Association. Recebeu doutoramentos honoris causa pela Stockholm School of
    Economics (1996) e pela University of East Anglia (2005).

    Nesta conferência, Paul Slovic falará sobre a forma como o afecto
    intervém no julgamento humano e na tomada de decisão. O resumo enviado
    pelo autor é o seguinte:

    <<In this talk, I shall attempt to articulate the role of affect in
    guiding judgments and decisions. As used here, "affect" means the
    specific quality of "goodness" or "badness" (i) experienced as a feeling
    state (with or without awareness) and (ii) demarcating a positive or
    negative quality of a stimulus. Affective reactions occur rapidly and
    automatically--note how quickly one senses the feelings associated with
    the stimulus word "treasure" or the word "hate." Reliance on such
    feelings when making judgments or decisions has been characterized as "the
    affect heuristic."
    The theoretical framework underlying the affect heuristic comes from
    research in cognitive and social psychology and cognitive neuroscience
    that informs us about two basic modes of thinking, experiential and
    analytic. The experiential system is intuitive, automatic, image-based,
    fast, and intimately associated with affective feelings. The analytic
    system is deliberative, reason-based, and slow. There are strong elements
    of rationality in both systems. It was the experiential system that
    allowed human beings to survive during their long period of evolution. 
    Long before there was probability theory, risk assessment, and decision
    analysis, there were intuition, instinct, and gut feelings to tell us
    whether an animal was safe to approach or the water was safe to drink. As
    life became more complex and humans gained more control over their
    environment, analytic tools were invented to "boost" the rationality of
    our experiential thinking. We recognize now that the experiential mode of
    thinking and the analytic mode of thinking are continually active,
    interacting in what we have characterized as "the dance of affect and
    reason." While we may be able to "do the right thing" without analysis
    (e.g., dodge a falling object), it is unlikely that we can employ analytic
    thinking rationally without guidance from affect. Rational decision
    making thus requires proper integration of both modes of thought.>>
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